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I. INTRODUCTION
China and the United States are engaged in international trade disputes
within the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) dispute settlement system which
1
are currently at a boiling point. On June 4, 2012, the U.S. Commerce
Department announced that it will likely impose a thirty-one percent tariff on all
2
solar panel imports from China. Two other recent disputes, filed in September
and October 2011, include allegations by the United States that China improperly
levied tariffs on Chinese chicken imports and that China failed to disclose details
3
of 200 Chinese subsidies as required by the WTO. Imposing tariffs on
4
international imports between the United States and China is reciprocal. China
announced on December 16, 2011 that it will impose anti-dumping tariffs on
imported U.S. vehicles with engines of 2.5-litres or above, effective from
5
December 15, 2011, and lasting two years. These recent examples illustrate the
current volatile nature of global trade between two of the largest importing and
6
exporting countries in the world.
Over the past decade, despite numerous safeguard complaints filed by the
United States against China alleging trade violations, not one has been
7
completely upheld by the WTO Appellate Body (“AB”). This trend ended on
* J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2013; B.A.,
Psychology, Arizona State University, 2003. I would like to thank Professor Michael P. Malloy for his insights
and support throughout the publication process. Additionally, I would like to thank my wife and five children
for their continued encouragement and affection.
1. Kara Loridas, United States-China Trade War: Signs of Protectionism in a Globalized Economy?, 34
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 403, 403 (2011); see generally Keith Bradsher, 200 Chinese Subsidies Violate
Rules, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/07/business/us-says-somechinese-subsidies-violate-traderules.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=200%20Chinese%20Subsidies%20Violate%20Rules&st=cse.
2. Dan Springer, Obama Administration’s Proposed Tariff on Chinese Solar Panels Raises Fear of
Trade War, FOX NEWS (June 4, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/06/04/us-solar-panel-trade-warwith-china/.
3. U.S. Files Complaint Against Chinese Chicken Tariffs, FOX NEWS (Sept. 20, 2011), http://www.
foxnews.com/world/2011/09/20/us-files-complaint-against-chinese-chicken-tariffs/; Bradsher, supra note 1; see
generally Garrett E. Lynam, Using WTO Countervailing Duty Law to Combat Illegally Subsidized Chinese
Enterprises Operating in a Nonmarket-Economy: Deciphering the Writing on the Wall, 42 CASE W. RES. J.
INT’L L. 739 (2010) (describing implications of illegal Chinese subsidies in relation to WTO obligations and
their effects on international trade).
4. See generally Lynam, supra note 3.
5. China’s Duties on US Imports Will Not Have Major Impact, AUTOS INSIGHT (Dec. 16, 2011),
http://www.autosinsight.com/file/107508/chinas-duties-on-us-imports-will-not-have-major-impact.html.
6. China Trade Profile, WTO (Oct. 2011), http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.
aspx?Language=E&Country=CN; United States Trade Profile, WTO (Oct. 2011), http://stat.wto.org/Country
Profile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=US.
7. Wenhua Ji & Cui Huang, China’s Experience in Dealing with WTO Dispute Settlement: A Chinese
Perspective, 45 J. WORLD TRADE 1, 11 (2011). From 2001 to the current tire dispute, the United States has filed
six petitions under safeguard measures. The U.S. International Trade Commission (“USITC”) rejected two
petitions after determining that market disruption had not been established. In the other four instances, President
Bush used his discretionary authority and denied granting relief. Id. Prior to the tire dispute, the last safeguard
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September 5, 2011, when the AB issued its report regarding Measures Affecting
8
Imports of Certain Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tyres from China (“AB
9
Tire Report”) in favor of the United States. It was the first time the WTO
10
completely upheld any kind of safeguard measure.
But what are the ramifications of the AB Tire Report? What will happen
when the U.S.-China Protocol expires in December 2013? What legal
implications does the AB Tire Report have on other trade industries such as the
solar industry? In the tire dispute, unlike previous failed disputes, the United
States adequately showed that imports from China were “increasing rapidly” and
11
that these imports “caused significant harm to the domestic industry.” Other
trade industries may be levied with tariffs by the United States because, from a
statistical standpoint, their percentage of imports is similar to percentages found
12
in the tire dispute. For example, because solar industry imports are at a similar
level to tire imports, the WTO may uphold tariffs imposed on China by the U.S.
13
solar industry. Thus, it is likely that the United States will experience success in
subsequent trade disputes with China.
Part II of this Comment introduces the background and procedure of China’s
accession into the WTO and discusses the U.S.-China Protocol and its
implications. Part III analyzes the initial 2009 tire dispute followed by an
explanation of the AB Tire Report. Part IV examines the legal implications the
AB Tire Report would have had on the previous U.S.-China Steel Dispute from
2003. In addition, Part IV will compare the AB Tire Report and what effects, if
any, it may have on other current international trade disputes, such as the solar
industry. It also discusses the possible effects and options once the U.S.-China
Protocol expires in December 2013.
In Part V, the Comment concludes that because the AB Tire Report expanded
definitions of critical terms within the U.S.-China Protocol and because other
industries, such as the solar industry are importing at similar levels to the tire
industry, the United States will likely experience success in subsequent trade
disputes with China.

measure to be upheld was under the GATT system in 1951. Dispute Settlement: WTO Adopts Reports on
China/US Tyres Case, WTO (Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/dsb_05oct11_e.htm.
8. The European spelling is “tyres.” However, I will use the American spelling “tires” throughout this
Comment.
9. Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting Imports of Certain Passenger Vehicle and
Light Truck Tyres from China, WT/DS399/AB/R (Sept. 5, 2011).
10. Dispute Settlement: WTO Adopts Reports on China/US Tyres Case, supra note 7 (noting that the last
such occurrence under the GATT system was in 1951).
11. See infra Part III.
12. See infra Part IV.B.
13. See infra Part IV.B.
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II. BACKGROUND
China’s emergence as a global power and its consistent growth since the
14
1980s into the third-largest economy is astonishing. Despite China’s
15
exceptionally rapid growth of trade with other nations in the 1980s and 1990s,
on December 11, 2001, after nearly fifteen years of contentious and tortuous
16
negotiations, China finally joined the WTO. At the time of China’s accession to
17
the WTO, China was the largest developing country in the world. There are
18
obvious reasons why China would view WTO membership as beneficial.
Arguably, the two biggest benefits China enjoys by joining the WTO are lowered
19
tariffs on its exports and the removal of non-tariff barriers.
Established on January 1, 1995, the WTO is the organization responsible for
20
regulating international trade, as it replaced the General Agreement on Tariffs
21
and Trade (“GATT”) as the international trading system. The goal of the WTO
is to level the playing field within the international trading system by eliminating
discrimination and promoting global free trade by way of multilateral
22
negotiations among member countries. The WTO wants to ensure that “trade
23
flows as smoothly, predictably, and freely as possible.” This is accomplished
24
through the Most Favored Nation (“MFN”) concept. MFN requires that any
advantage or privilege given to one member country must be given to all member
25
countries. MFN is based on a concept of non-discrimination and full
14. Pasha L. Hsieh, China’s Development of International Economic Law and WTO Legal Capacity
Building, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 997, 997 (2010).
15. Xiaohui Wu, Agora: Ten Years of China’s Participation in the WTO: No Longer Outside, Not Yet
Equal: Rethinking China’s Membership in the World Trade Organization, 10 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 227, 229
(2011).
16. Jing Ma, Product-Specific Safeguard in China’s WTO Accession Agreement: An Analysis of its
Terms and its Initial Application in Section 421 Investigations, 22 B.U. INT’L L.J. 189, 189 (2004); Henry Gao,
China’s Participation in the WTO: A Lawyer’s Perspective, 11 SING. Y.B. INT’L L. 41, 41 (2007); see Wu,
supra note 15, at 228.
17. Wu, supra note 15, at 228.
18. Karen Halverson, China’s WTO Accession: Economic, Legal, and Political Implications, 27 B.C.
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 319, 332 (2004). Two obvious benefits to joining the WTO include the “benefit from
the recognition and prestige that WTO membership brings” and “deepen[ing] China’s integration into the world
economy and signal[ing] its status as a world economic power.” Id.
19. Gao, supra note 16, at 48. As a WTO member, China benefits from MFN tariff rates, which are
lower than previous rates applicable to China before the accession. Id.
20. MICHAEL P. MALLOY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT 241 (forthcoming).
21. Loridas, supra note 1, at 405.
22. Id.
23. Lynam, supra note 3, at 743.
24. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATT] (adopting the MFN concept).
25. Id. (requiring that “any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity” be consistently granted to all
members); see also Loridas, supra note 1, at 406-07; see also Thomas P. Holt, CNOOC-UNOCAL and the
WTO: Discriminatory Rules in the China Protocol Are a Latent Threat to the Rule of Law in the Dispute
Settlement Understanding, 15 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 457, 474 (2006).

190

[8] ANDERSON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2/11/20131:42 PM

Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 26
26

transparency. Therefore, if any privilege or advantage is extended to one WTO
27
member state, it must also be granted to all member states.
China was granted permanent MFN status by the United States during
28
China’s accession to the WTO. Prior to being granted MFN status, China was
required to submit to “highly controversial and politicized annual reviews” by the
U.S. Congress pursuant to the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Trade
29
Act. With the annual reviews abolished, China’s accession to the WTO was
looked upon as a major step towards developing a more transparent and globally
30
competitive economy within the world trading system. However, the question
remained whether China would be governed by the normal WTO Safeguard
Agreement (“WTO Product-Specific Safeguard”) like other member nations
31
before the Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”).
A. WTO Product-Specific Safeguard
One of the highly contested issues in the negotiation process was the WTO
32
Product-Specific Safeguard clause and how it would be applied to China. One
33
consequence or advantage of China’s accession to the WTO is access to the
34
WTO DSB. Annex 2 of the WTO Charter creates the Dispute Settlement
35
Understanding (“DSU”) which all member states are subject to. The DSU
36
subsequently creates the DSB and authorizes the DSB to establish a standing

26. Loridas, supra note 1, at 406-07; see also Holt, supra note 25, at 474.
27. Loridas, supra note 1, at 406-07; see also Holt, supra note 25, at 474.
28. Wu, supra note 15, at 237.
29. Id. at 237-38. Under the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, Congress was required to annually review
China and its trading practices and decide whether or not to extend MFN status to China for that year. The
economic risks caused by the annual review of U.S. Congress were enormous and thus, China was eager to get
rid of it. Id.; see also Charles Tiefer, SINO 301: How Congress Can Effectively Review Relations with China
After WTO Accession, 34 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 55, 60-62 (2001); see Gao, supra note 16, at 45.
30. Wu, supra note 15, at 237.
31. See Agreement on Safeguards, WTO Agreement art. XIX, available at http://www.wto.org/
english/docs_e/legal_e/25-safeg.pdf [hereinafter Agreement on Safeguards]; Fabio Spadi, Discriminatory
Safeguards in the Light of the Admission of the People’s Republic of China to the World Trade Organization, 5
J. INT’L ECON. L. 421, 421 (2002).
32. Spadi, supra note 31, at 421.
33. See Christopher Duncan, Out of Conformity: China’s Capacity to Implement World Trade
Organization Dispute Settlement Body Decisions After Accession, 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 399, 485 (2002)
(discussing consequences of the DSB in relation to China’s capacity to comply); but see Wu, supra note 15, at
238 (stating one advantage is China’s access to the DSB allows China the opportunity to bring other members
to the DSB for WTO-inconsistent measures and seek redress).
34. Wu, supra note 15, at 238.
35. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 2, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter
DSU]; see also MALLOY ET AL., supra note 20, at 239.
36. DSU, supra note 35, at art. 2.

191

[8] ANDERSON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2/11/20131:42 PM

2013 / WTO Appellate Body Upholds U.S. Safeguard Measures
37

38

AB capable of resolving disputes between member states. Settlement of
39
disputes between WTO members is the sole responsibility of the DSB. Because
all member states are subject to the DSU and DSB, the DSB enjoys mandatory,
40
compulsory jurisdiction. Therefore, regardless of whether or not China would
be governed by the WTO Product-Specific Safeguard, China would be entitled to
41
resolve all disputes before the DSB.
42
Pursuant to GATT Article XIX, known as the “escape clause,” the WTO
Product-Specific Safeguard permits members to depart from its GATT
obligations “to the extent necessary to address serious injury to a domestic
43
industry caused by imports” (i.e. safeguard measures). Members may apply
safeguard measures to a product only if “such product is being imported into its
territory in such increased quantities, absolute or relative to domestic production,
and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the
44
domestic industry that produces like or directly competitive products.”
The traditional view of this measure is that it should apply in a non45
discriminatory manner to all WTO member nations. Unfortunately for China,
this safeguard measure does not apply to China or any products imported from
46
China. This is because within the procedure of WTO accession, China was
required to enter bilateral negotiations with other member nations and agreedupon accession terms as drafted and outlined in a protocol of accession
47
document. In other words, prior to WTO membership, the protocol of accession
48
document represented the rudimentary terms of entry for China into the WTO.
B. China as a Non-Market Economy and the U.S.-China Protocol
In November 1999, the United States and China finally signed a bilateral
49
agreement on China’s accession to the WTO (“U.S.-China Protocol”).
However, it did not take effect until China was officially voted into the WTO at

37. Id. at art. 17.
38. MALLOY ET AL., supra note 20, at 240.
39. Id. at 717.
40. Gao, supra note 16, at 71; see also Wu, supra note 15, at 238.
41. Gao, supra note 16, at 71.
42. GATT, supra note 24, at art. XIX.
43. Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 31; see also MALLOY ET AL., supra note 20, at 242.
44. Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 31.
45. Spadi, supra note 31, at 422.
46. Ma, supra note 16, at 195.
47. Halverson, supra note 18, at 324.
48. Duncan, supra note 33, at 459; see Halverson, supra note 18, at 323-24 (explaining that accession
requires bilateral negotiations finalized in “three documents: the working party report, the protocol of accession,
and the attached schedules contain[ing] the new member’s specific liberalization commitments.”).
49. Halverson, supra note 18, at 324.
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50

the Doha Ministerial Meeting in November 2001. Because the expiration of the
U.S.-China Protocol is set for twelve years after accession, it is to expire in
51
December 2013.
1. Implications of China Categorized as a Non-Market Economy
Despite China’s requests to be categorized as a comprehensive “developing
52
country” when ascending to the WTO, and after arduous negotiations, China
53
reluctantly acquiesced to be treated as a “non-market economy” (“NME”).
Therefore, China, as an NME, is subject to specific conditions by other WTO
54
members, including the United States. China agreed to be treated as an NME for
a period of fifteen years from the date of its accession to the WTO; thus, it will
55
expire in December 2016.
Had China been categorized as a “developing country” during its accession
to the WTO, the U.S-China Protocol would be non-existent and, therefore, China
would not be susceptible to a lower threshold of product-specific safeguards as
56
found within the U.S.-China Protocol. Furthermore, had China been categorized
as a “developing country,” member nations would need to show that imports are
57
causing “serious injury,” rather than “a significant cause of material injury.”
However, since China consented into the WTO as an NME, this lower threshold
of injuries found in the U.S.-China Protocol only applies to China and products
58
imported from China. Because many members worried that the application of
normal safeguard measures under the WTO Product-Specific Safeguard
59
Agreement might not be enough to counter the China threat, China had to agree
to a special safeguard mechanism in its accession package: the U.S.-China
60
Protocol.

50. Id. at 324-25.
51. Gao, supra note 16, at 55-56; see also Halverson, supra note 18, at 330-31.
52. Wu, supra note 15, at 235.
53. Id. at 239; see Lynam, supra note 3, at 748 (stating that the United States labels China as a “NME
despite the fact that there are pockets of market-oriented economies in China”).
54. Wu, supra note 15, at 239; see Lynam, supra note 3, at 748.
55. Carlos Esplugues Mota, Chapter 1: China’s Accession to WTO, in CHINESE BUSINESS LAW 1, 9
(2010).
56. Wu, supra note 15, at 239.
57. See supra Part II (explaining the differing injury thresholds between the WTO Product-Specific
Safeguard and the U.S.-China Protocol).
58. Wu, supra note 15, at 239.
59. Gao, supra note 16, at 55-56; see Halverson, supra note 18, at 325 (explaining that WTO members
viewed China as a major source of cheap labor imports and thus a threat to domestic industry); see Spadi, supra
note 31, at 430 (stating concerns including China’s lack of transparency, the high number of state enterprises,
and the constant role of central and local authorities).
60. Gao, supra note 16, at 55.
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2. U.S.-China Protocol
Compared with the WTO Product-Specific Safeguard mechanisms applicable
to other member states, the special “transitional product-specific safeguard”
mechanism (“TPSS”) found within the U.S.-China Protocol includes many
61
unique features. First, the TPSS may be “triggered by ‘market disruption,’
which is deemed to exist so long as imports are ‘a significant cause of material
injury,’ rather than causing ‘serious injury,’ as would have been required under
62
the [WTO Product-Specific] Safeguards Agreement.” Second, the TPSS only
63
applies to China and products imported from China. Third, pursuant to the
WTO Product-Specific Safeguard, if “a safeguard measure” is imposed on “an
increase of imports, the affected export members are allowed to retaliate
64
immediately.” However, the TPSS provides that China has “the right to retaliate
65
only if such [safeguard] measures remain in effect for more than two years.”
These and other unique variances between the WTO Product-Specific Safeguard
and U.S.-China Protocol provide for substantial differences in application and
66
outcome of disputes within the DSB.
The U.S.-China Protocol remains in effect for twelve years after succession
67
and is set to expire in December 2013. The first unique feature is found in
Article 16 of the U.S.-China Protocol. Article 1, paragraph 16.1 of the
“Transitional Product-Specific Safeguard Mechanism” section of the U.S.-China
Protocol provides:
In cases where products of Chinese origin are being imported into the
territory of any WTO Member in such increased quantities or under such
conditions as to cause or threaten to cause market disruption to the
domestic producers of like or directly competitive products, the WTO
Member so affected may request consultations with China with a view to
seeking a mutually satisfactory solution, including whether the affected
WTO Member should pursue application of a measure under the
68
Agreement on Safeguards . . . .
Compared with the normal WTO Product-Specific Safeguard Agreement
which applies to all other MFN members, the TPPS is “triggered by ‘market

61. Id. at 55-56.
62. Id. at 55.
63. Id. at 55-56.
64. Id. at 55.
65. Id.
66. Id.; see supra Part II.
67. Gao, supra note 16, at 55-56; see Halverson, supra note 18, at 330-31.
68. WTO Ministerial Conference, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China,
WT/L/432, at art.16.1 (Nov. 23, 2001), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/L/432.doc.
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disruption’ which . . . exist[s] so long as imports are ‘a significant cause of
material injury,’ rather than causing ‘serious injury’” as applied to other MFN
69
member countries within the WTO. In determining whether market disruption
exists, Paragraph 16.4 of the same section provides:
Market disruption shall exist whenever imports of an article, like or
directly competitive with an article produced by the domestic industry,
are increasing rapidly, either absolutely or relatively, so as to be a
significant cause of material injury, or threat of material injury to the
domestic industry. In determining if market disruption exists, the
affected WTO Member shall consider objective factors, including the
volume of imports, the effect of imports on prices for like or directly
competitive articles, and the effect of such imports on the domestic
70
industry producing like or directly competitive products.
Thus, “[t]he TPSS allows other WTO members to impose” quantitative
restrictions and “tariffs on Chinese goods upon a minimal showing of injury, and
71
it restricts China’s ability to retaliate.” In other words, “the threshold” for
72
imposing safeguard measures against China “is at its lowest point.” As stated,
the U.S.-China Protocol not only “singles out China,” but imposes a number “of
highly specific” and “unique” obligations “not required of any other WTO
73
member.”
Despite the lessened threshold of “material injury” needed to obtain relief,
the WTO AB has never completely upheld a safeguard measure dispute against
74
China. However, on September 5, 2011, the WTO released the AB Tire Report
75
which was in favor of the United States. Prior to the WTO AB Tire Report, the
last time safeguard measures were upheld in favor of the United States was in
76
1951, but it was under the then existing and governing GATT system.

69. Gao, supra note 16, at 55.
70. WTO Ministerial Conference, supra note 68, § III, art. 1, ¶ 16.4.
71. Halverson, supra note 18, at 331; see Thomas Peele III, U.S. Trade Law Affecting China After
China’s Accession to the WTO, 817 PRACTICING L. INST. 115, 140 (2001) (providing that such measures may
take various forms including increased tariffs, quotas or tariff-rate quotas).
72. Spadi, supra note 31, at 441.
73. Holt, supra note 25, at 479; see also supra Part II.B (outlining the specific and unique obligations of
the U.S.-China Protocol).
74. Ji & Huang, supra note 7, at 11; Gao, supra note 16, at 55.
75. Appellate Body Report, supra note 9.
76. Ji & Huang, supra note 7, at 11; see also Dispute Settlement: WTO Adopts Reports on China/US
Tyres Case, supra note 7 (noting that the last such occurrence under the GATT system was in 1951).
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III. THERE IS A FIRST TIME FOR EVERYTHING: WTO APPELLATE BODY
COMPLETELY UPHOLDS SAFEGUARD MEASURES IN TIRE DISPUTE
On September 5, 2011, the WTO issued its AB Tire Report regarding certain
77
imported tires from China in favor of the United States. The AB “affirmed an
earlier ruling by a WTO dispute settlement panel” (“Panel Report”), which held
“that the United States did not act inconsistently with its WTO obligations when
it imposed a tariff . . . on imports of certain passenger vehicle and light truck tires
78
from China.”
A. Initial Tire Dispute—Findings in Panel Report
The initial dispute arose in 2007 when a petition was filed with the U.S.
International Trade Commission (“USITC”) on behalf of the United Steel
Workers (“USW”) “accusing Chinese manufacturers of exporting” certain
79
subsidized tires “to the U.S. market to the detriment of the domestic industry.”
Subsequently, U.S. President Barack Obama, by invoking the TPPS clause in the
U.S.-China Protocol, “imposed a safeguard measure on imports of subject t[i]res
in the form of additional import duties for a three-year period: 35% ad valorem in
the first year; 30% ad valorem in the second year; and 25% ad valorem in the
80
81
third year.” The measure took effect on September 26, 2009.
The WTO Panel Body reviewed import data from 2004 through 2008, the
period of investigation, and noted annual percentage increases in imports
82
between 2005 and 2008. Based on this data, the Panel held that imports from
China were “increasing rapidly” for the following reasons:
In absolute terms, imports of subject tires from China increased
throughout the period of investigation and were the highest, in terms of
both quantity and value, in 2008, at the end of the period. The quantity of

77. Appellate Body Report, supra note 9.
78. WTO Appellate Body Upholds Special Safeguard Measures Imposed by the United States on Certain
Chinese Tires, MAYER BROWN (Sept. 12, 2011), http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/article.
asp?id=11548&nid=6.
79. Alexis Early, Where the Rubber Meets the Road: What Chinese Tires Mean for Obama’s Trade
Policy, 6 BUS. L. BRIEF 63, 63 (2010).
80. Appellate Body Report, supra note 9; see also Tyre Production Continues to Rise in August,
AUTOMOTIVEWORLD (Sept. 20, 2011), http://www.automotiveworld.com/news/suppliers/89375-china-tyreproduction-continues-to-rise-in-august; see also US Trade Officials, Unions Hail WTO Ruling on China Tyres,
MORRIS ANDERSON (Sept. 6, 2011), http://www.morrisanderson.com/resource-center/entry/US-trade-officialsunions-hail-WTO-ruling-on-China-tyres/.
81. Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting Imports of Certain Passenger Vehicle and Light
Truck Tyres from China, para. 2.2, WT/DS399/R (Dec. 13, 2010) [hereinafter Panel Report]; see JEFFREY L.
KESSLER & SPENCER WEBER WALLER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND U.S. ANTITRUST LAW § 12:7 (2d ed.
2011).
82. Panel Report, supra note 81, at para. 7.83; Appellate Body Report, supra note 9, para. 150.
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subject imports rose by 215.5 percent between 2004 and 2008, by 53.7
percent between 2006 and 2007, and by 10.8 percent between 2007 and
2008. The value of subject imports rose even more rapidly, increasing by
294.5 percent between 2004 and 2008, by 60.2 percent between 2006 and
83
2007, and by 19.8 percent between 2007 and 2008.
However, China pointed out that because there was a decline in the rate of
increase in subject imports in 2008 to 10.8 percent, this undermined the U.S.
argument of “increasing rapidly” within the meaning of Paragraph 16.4 of the
84
U.S.-China Protocol. Unfortunately for China, the Panel did not agree and
explained that:
[T]he fact that the 10.8 [percent] increase in 2008 was lower than the
increase in the preceding year does not mean that imports were not
“increasing rapidly” in 2008. An increase of 10.8 [percent] in 2008 by no
means precludes a finding that imports are “increasing rapidly”,
especially when that increase is assessed in context. Nor is it a “modest”
increase. In this regard, we recall that the 10.8 [percent] increase in
absolute volumes between 2007 and 2008 was in addition to an increase
of 53.7 [percent] between 2006 and 2007, which was in addition to an
increase of 29.9 [percent] between 2005 and 2006, which was in addition
to an increase of 42.7 [percent] between 2004 and 2005. In our view, the
10.8 [percent] increase in absolute volumes from 2007 to 2008 reinforces
the USITC’s conclusion that imports were “increasing rapidly” during
the period, and continued to be “increasing rapidly” at the end of the
85
period.
The Panel went on to state that, over the period of investigation, the market
share of subject imports increased by twelve percent, whereas the ratio of subject
imports relative to domestic production increased by twenty-two percent over the
86
entire period. Based on this, the Panel concluded that “regardless of a focus on
imports relative to market share or relative to domestic production there were
increases from year to year and significant increases over the period of
87
investigation.”

83. Panel Report, supra note 81, paras. 7.85-7.86.
84. Appellate Body Report, supra note 9, at paras. 155, 161 (quoting Notification of an Appeal by
China, United States – Measures Affecting Imports of Certain Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tyres from
China, paras. 159-63, WT/DS399/6 (May 27, 2011) [hereinafter China’s Appellant’s Submission]).
85. Panel Report, supra note 81, at para. 7.93.
86. Id. at para. 7.96.
87. Id. at para. 7.98.
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Because of these statistics and the evidence shown by the United States, the
88
Panel Report was issued in favor of the United States on December 13, 2010.
89
China appealed the decision on May 24, 2011.
B. Appellate Body Tire Report
In its appeal, China argued that the Panel erred in its application of the
“increasing rapidly” standard because the investigating authorities, the USITC,
should not have assessed import increases over the entire five-year period
90
between 2004 and 2008. Moreover, China argued that the term “rapidly” in
“increasing rapidly” requires that investigating authorities focus on the rates of
91
increase in subject imports. In addition, China argued that the Panel erred when
it established that rapidly increasing imports from China was “a significant
cause” of material injury to the U.S. industry because, as China alleged, the word
“significant” requires a heightened causation standard, which the United States
92
had failed to prove.
1. Clarification of the Term “Increasing Rapidly” within the U.S.-China
Protocol
China argued that investigating authorities and the USITC should not have
93
assessed import increases over the entire five-year period. Rather, China argued
that the definition of “increasing” means the most recent period: thus in this case,
94
the Panel should have only looked at import data during 2008.
The United States responded by arguing that because there is no explicitly
prescribed period of investigation in Paragraph 16.4 of the U.S.-China Protocol,
that authorities have discretion to select any period, provided that it allows for an
95
assessment of import increases during a “recent period.”
96
The AB was not persuaded by China’s arguments. The AB held that
“nothing in the use of the present continuous tense ‘are increasing’ in Paragraph
16.4 and ‘are being imported’ in Paragraph 16.1 implies that the analysis must be
97
limited to import data relating to the very end of the period of investigation.”

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
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Id. at para. 2.2.
Id. at annex I.
Appellate Body Report, supra note 9, at para. 143.
Id. at para. 154.
Id. at para. 173.
Id. at para. 143.
Id. at paras. 142-43.
Panel Report, supra note 81, at para. 7.88.
See infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text; see generally Appellate Body Report, supra note 9.
Appellate Body Report, supra note 9, at para. 147.
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Thus, to use only import data relating to 2008 would be incorrect. The AB
subsequently held that the term “increasing rapidly” required investigating
authorities to evaluate import trends over a “sufficiently recent period,” and to
determine whether imports are significantly increasing within a short period of
99
time. Moreover, the period between 2004 and 2008, as analyzed by the USITC,
was a sufficiently recent period and was therefore correct as the United States
100
had alleged.
China additionally argued that the term “rapidly” in “increasing rapidly”
requires that investigating authorities focus on the rates of increase in subject
101
imports. Without focusing on the rates of increase, China argued, “there is no
102
way to determine whether an increase is occurring at a ‘great speed . . . .’”
China emphasized “that ‘rapidly’ is a relative concept, which conveys the idea
that something is increasing more quickly than something else, and therefore it is
103
‘useful’ to assess the rates of increase in subject imports.”
The United States countered China’s definition of “rapidly” and claimed that
“rapidly” does not require that imports be increasing not only “swiftly” or
104
“quickly,” but also “at an accelerating rate of increase.” The AB, reaffirming
the Panel Report and concurring with the United States, held that the text of
Paragraph 16.4 “requires that imports—and not the rates of increase in imports—
105
be increasing ‘rapidly.’” The AB went on to explain that although it may be
useful for investigating authorities to review rates of increase in imports, a
decline in the yearly rate of increase does not “necessarily preclude a finding that
106
imports are ‘increasing rapidly.’” After elaborating the definition of “increasing
rapidly,” the AB continued its analysis by further defining the term “a significant
107
cause.”
2. Clarification of the Term “Significant Cause” within the U.S.-China
Protocol
China argued for several reasons that the USITC erred when it established
that rapidly increasing imports from China was “a significant cause” of material
injury to the domestic industry under Paragraph 16.4 of the U.S.-China

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id. at para. 167.
Id. at para. 147.
Id. at para. 154.
Id.
Id.
Id. at para. 156.
Id. at para. 158.
Id. (quoting Panel Report, supra note 81, at para. 7.92).
Id.

199

[8] ANDERSON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2/11/20131:42 PM

2013 / WTO Appellate Body Upholds U.S. Safeguard Measures
108

Protocol. First, China argued that the term “significant” imposes a more
rigorous causation standard requiring a “particularly strong, substantial, and
important causal connection” between rapidly increasing imports and material
109
injury to the domestic industry.
The AB, in its effort to define the term “significant cause,” looked at the
ordinary meaning of the term and held that Paragraph 16.4 suggested that
“rapidly increasing imports must be an ‘important’ or ‘notable’ factor in
‘bringing about, producing, or inducing’ material injury to the domestic
110
industry.” Thus, the AB held that a more rigorous causation standard, as argued
111
by China, is not necessary.
The WTO AB concluded that the surge of Chinese tire imports within the
United States constituted “a significant cause of material injury to the domestic
industry,” and thus, the tariffs were consistent with international trade
112
agreements. The United States argued before the DSB that the volume of
Chinese tire imports had more than tripled in the previous four years, to reach
$1.8 billion in value, while the U.S. production had shrunk by more than twentyfive percent in the same period, with fourteen percent of U.S. workers in the
113
industry losing their jobs.
Despite China’s argument that a decrease in the rate of increase during 2008
signifies a lack of “increasing rapidly,” the AB found no error in the Panels’
reasoning and concluded that a decline in the rates of increase in imports towards
the end of the period of investigation was nevertheless sufficient to constitute
114
“increasing rapidly” in both relative and absolute terms.
Since this is the first safeguard dispute to be completely upheld by the WTO,
what are its likely effects? Will it undermine or provide guidance to current
pending and subsequent disputes not only within the tire industry but other
international trade industries? What will happen after the U.S.-China Protocol
expires in December 2013?

108. Appellate Body Report, supra note 9, at para. 171.
109. Id. at para. 173 (quoting China’s Appellant’s Submission, supra note 84, at para. 193).
110. Appellate Body Report, supra note 9, at para. 176.
111. Id. at para. 181.
112. WTO Rules Against China in US Tyre Imports Case, DOMAIN-B (Sept. 6, 2011),
http://www.domain-b.com/organisation/wto/20110906_us_tyre.html.
113. Prakash Narayanan & Andrew Thompson, World Trade Organization 2010 Marks an Important
Shift for China, BLAKES (Feb. 18, 2011), http://www.blakes.com/english/view_bulletin.asp?ID=4581.
114. Appellate Body Report, supra note 9, at para. 161-62.
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IV. REEVALUATING THE U.S.-CHINA STEEL DISPUTE, LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF
THE AB TIRE REPORT ON THE SOLAR INDUSTRY AND THE EXPIRATION OF THE
U.S.-CHINA PROTOCOL
Because the AB Tire Report was the first time a safeguard measure was
115
completely upheld under the current WTO, it is regarded as having great legal
significance. It has been stated that the U.S.-China Protocol is wrought with
unworkable vague ambiguities, and therefore, if the United States hopes to be
successful in international trade disputes against China, the United States needs
116
to address these ambiguities. The release of the AB Tire Report helped clarify
some of the unworkable vague ambiguities because the AB specifically defined
117
key terms within the U.S.-China Protocol. Applying the recently defined key
terms to current and potential future safeguard disputes, it is possible to gain
118
insight on their likely outcomes. However, since the U.S.-China Protocol
119
expires in December 2013, the future of current safeguard tariffs is uncertain
and WTO members may be limited in bringing and sustaining safeguard
measures against China.
A. Reevaluation of the 2003 U.S.-China Steel Dispute
The AB Tire Report provides essential definitions of key terms within the
120
U.S.-China Protocol vital for subsequent international trade disputes.
Significant terms explained by the AB include: “increasing,” “rapidly,”
121
“significant cause,” and “material injury.” Knowing how future WTO appellate
bodies will apply these terms found in Paragraphs 16.4 and 16.1 of the U.S.China Protocol will assist the United States and other countries in determining
122
how and whether or not subsequent disputes should be filed. In fact, the
123
European Union welcomed the findings of the Panel and AB reports. U.S.
Trade Representative Ron Kirk called the ruling a “tremendous victory” for
American workers and U.S. manufacturers and continued by stating that the

115. Ji & Huang, supra note 7, at 11.
116. Lynam, supra note 3, at 743; Jennifer Rivett Schick, Agreement on Safeguards: Realistic Tools for
Protecting Domestic Industry or Protectionist Measures?, 27 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 153, 186-88
(2003); see also generally TERENCE P. STEWART, CHINA IN THE WTO – YEAR 3 (2005), available at
http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2005/05_01_21_china_inthe_wto.htm.
117. See supra Part III.B.
118. See infra Part IV.
119. Ji & Huang, supra note 7, at 11.
120. See supra Part III.B.
121. See supra Part III.B.
122. Lynam, supra note 3, at 743; Schick, supra note 116, at 186-88; see also generally STEWART,
supra note 116.
123. Dispute Settlement: WTO Adopts Reports on China/US Tyres Case, supra note 7.
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Obama administration will continue to fight for U.S. jobs and businesses.
Cognizant of the newly defined key terms in the AB Tire Report, it is now
possible to reanalyze the unsuccessful causation requirement in the 2003 U.S.125
China Steel Dispute.
1. United States’ Failure to Establish Causation in the U.S.-China Steel
Dispute

One reason why the United States was not successful in prior disputes before
the DSB was the failure to establish a causal link between increased imports of a
126
product and “serious injury or threat thereof.” In other words, prior to the AB
Tire Report, in order to satisfy the WTO causation requirement, a member
127
country had to prove that the injury was caused by increased imports alone.
On March 5, 2002, the United States imposed a safeguard measure on $8.5
128
billion worth of certain steel products. Nine members, including China, were
129
complainants who claimed the tariffs violated WTO provisions. On July 11,
2003, the WTO Panel ruled on the U.S.-China Steel Dispute that the U.S. tariffs
130
on imported steel were illegal. Specifically, the Panel concluded that the United
States violated the parallelism requirement (i.e. “a significant cause”) and did not
131
provide a reasoned and adequate explanation for its support to use a tariff.
Additionally, the relevant data during the five and a half-year period in which the
AB reviewed, indicated that imports of subject steel products did not steadily
increase, but increased for part of the period and decreased during the remaining
132
months or years.
One flaw by the United States in the U.S.-China Steel Dispute was failing to
account for and adequately explain away other potential factors attributable to the

124. United States Prevails in WTO Dispute About Chinese Tire Imports, OFF. U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE (Sept. 2011), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2011/september/
united-states-prevails-wto-dispute-about-chinese.
125. Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel
Products, WT/DS248/AB/R (Oct. 9, 2003), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_
e/distabase_wto_members4_e.htm [hereinafter Steel Appellate Body Report]; see supra Part III.B.
126. Morgan Frohman, Is Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 Consistent with the World Trade
Organization Agreement on Safeguards?, 17 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 127, 149 (2004).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 133.
129. Wei Zhuang, An Empirical Study of China’s Participation in the WTO Dispute Settlement
Mechanism: 2001-2010, 4 L. DEV. REV. 217, 236 (2011).
130. Steel Appellate Body Report, supra note 125; see also Frohman, supra note 126, at 135.
131. Frohman, supra note 126, at 141. Parallelism requires that imports included in the injury
determination must correspond to the imports covered by the safeguard measure. Id. at 158-59. In other words,
a country may only apply safeguard measures to a product if the increased imports are the cause of injury to the
domestic injury. Id. at 159.
132. Steel Appellate Body Report, supra note 125, at para. 26; see also Raj Bhala & David A. Gantz,
WTO Case Review 2003, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 317, 405-06 (2004).
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alleged injury. In other words, the United States failed to convince the WTO
134
Panel Body that steel imports were “a significant cause” of the domestic injury.
Brazil argued against the United States in the dispute claiming that the decline of
the U.S. steel industry was because the U.S. steel industry was “weak,
fragmented, and saddled with inefficient and/or antiquated capacity well in
excess of demand” and not as a result from increased imports from U.S. foreign
135
trading partners. Additionally, other foreign trading partners such as the
European Union, New Zealand, and Switzerland argued that the “differences in
inputs and production methods” along with the U.S. steel industries’ “transition
136
to become modern and more efficient” was the cause of the domestic injury. In
the U.S.-China Steel Dispute, the United States failed to meet the causation
requirement due to the vagueness and the ambiguity of the term “a significant
137
cause.” The AB Tire Report now helps clarify this otherwise ambiguous term
138
within the U.S.-China Protocol.
2. AB Tire Report Assists in Clarifying the Causation Requirement in the
U.S.-China Protocol
The recent AB Tire Report helps clarify the vagueness of the term “a
139
significant cause” within the U.S.-China Protocol. Because the AB held that “a
significant cause” must be an “important” or “notable” factor in “bringing about,
140
producing, or inducing material injury to the domestic industry,” it suggests a
less rigorous standard than what the Panel held nearly ten years ago in the U.S.141
China Steel Dispute. Therefore, even if one of the causes of domestic injury
was the steel industries’ need for reorganization, it is plausible that under the
current AB’s definition of “a significant cause,” as long as the United States
showed that foreign steel imports was an “important” or “notable” factor in
bringing about the material injury, the United States may have been successful in
establishing causation. Another relevant factor is that subject imports in both the
2003 U.S.-China Steel Dispute and the 2009 tire dispute actually decreased in
142
one or more preceding years.
133. Frohman, supra note 126, at 149-50 (complainants argued that injury within the steel industry was
caused by its need for reorganization and not as a result from increased imports from foreign member
countries); see Steel: Volume I: Determinations and Views of Commissioners, Inv. No. 201-TA-73, USITC
Pub. 3479 (Dec. 20, 2001) (Final).
134. Frohman, supra note 126, at 149-50.
135. Id. at 150.
136. Id. at 150-51.
137. Id. at 152.
138. See supra Part III
139. See supra Part III.B.
140. Appellate Body Report, supra note 9, at para. 176.
141. Steel Appellate Body Report, supra note 125.
142. See supra Parts III.A, IV.A.
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In the tire dispute, addressing the decrease in imports from the preceding
year, the Panel Report stated that even though a percent increase was lower than
the preceding year, it “by no means precludes a finding that imports are
143
‘increasing rapidly . . . .’” The AB Tire Report concurred with the Panel Report
holding that although it may be “useful” for investigating authorities to review
rates of increase in imports, a decline in the yearly rate of increase does not
144
“necessarily preclude a finding that imports are ‘increasing rapidly.’”
Similarly, in the U.S.-China Steel Dispute, the relevant data during the
subject period indicated that imports of subject steel products did not steadily
increase, but increased for part of the period and decreased during the remaining
145
months or years. Therefore, it is plausible under the AB Tire Report’s holding,
that since a decrease in imports from the preceding year does not preclude the
finding that imports are “increasing rapidly,” subject imports in the U.S.-China
146
Steel Dispute nevertheless may have been held to be “increasing rapidly.”
One immediate ramification of the appellate finding is that China’s domestic
147
tire sector may be consolidated. Shen Danyang, from China’s Ministry of
Commerce, stated that the action “was a protectionist measure aimed at indulging
domestic political pressures in the [United States] and it distorted the order of
148
bilateral trade.” Shen went on to state that “[t]he move hurt the legitimate
149
interests of Chinese enterprises, and brought no benefits to the U.S. side.”
Consolidation of the Chinese tire industry and other industries that may also be
affected may have detrimental effects to both the industry and to trade relations
150
between China and the United States and other member nations.
The constant barrage of international trade disputes between China and the
United States may lead one to believe that safeguard measures are merely a form
151
of global protectionism. Others believe safeguard measures are in the best

143. Appellate Body Report, supra note 9, at para. 7.93.
144. Id. at para. 158 (quoting Panel Report, supra note 81, at para. 7.92).
145. Steel Appellate Body Report, supra note 125, at para. 26.
146. See supra Part III.B.
147. CRIA Expects Consolidation in Tyre Industry in Wake of WTO Tariff Ruling, RUBBER MARKET
NEWS (Sept. 26, 2011), http://rubbermarketnews.net/2011/09/cria-expects-consolidation-in-tyre-industry-inwake-of-wto-tariff-ruling/.
148. US Urged to Scrap Special Tariffs on Chinese Tires, CHINA DAILY (Sept. 20, 2011, 5:28 PM),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2011-09/20/content_13744005.htm.
149. Id.
150. See id.
151. See generally Jie Zhou, The Role and Impact of the New Global Protectionism in Recent U.S.China Trade Relations with Illustrations from China’s Toy and Tire Industries (2011) (unpublished MBus
dissertation, Auckland University of Technology), available at http://aut.researchgateway.ac.nz/
bitstream/handle/10292/1217/JieZ.pdf?sequence=3 (arguing trade disputes between the United States and China
are forms of global protectionism); see also Nan Sato, Red Dragon Gone Green: China’s Approach to
Renewable Energy Technologies, Its Legal Implications, and Its Impact on U.S. Energy Policy, 2011 U. ILL.
J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 463, 476 (2011) (stating import duties are likely to be criticized as a form of trade
protectionism).
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interest of the United States in order to revive the U.S. economy by creating more
152
jobs and maintaining opportunities for American companies.
In connection with this, another ramification is that since the AB Tire Report
was in favor of the United States, it may encourage future trading disputes
against China. On January 24, 2012, U.S. President Obama stated in his recent
state-of-the-union address that his administration has brought trade cases against
China “at nearly twice the rate as the last administration,” and announced the
creation of an Enforcement Task Force to investigate unfair trade violations by
153
China. This tougher stance on trade violations may have negative consequences
154
to the already volatile China-U.S. trade relationship. On the other hand, it may
155
boost the lagging U.S. economy and create more jobs for the American people.
This is because China’s unfair trade practices have created a huge trade gap
156
between the United States and China that have cost Americans millions of jobs.
Therefore, by preventing these unfair trade practices through sanctions and
dispute resolution, the effect is believed to boost the U.S. economy by creating
157
more domestic U.S. jobs.
Whether or not an increase in litigation involving trading practices is viewed
158
159
as positive or negative, one unsolved issue is what effect does the AB Tire
Report have on other trade industries like solar panels? More specifically, what
effects will the clarified terms of “increasing rapidly” and “a significant cause”
have on current solar industry disputes?

152. Zhu Qiwen, Commentary: Time for Plain Talk on Trade, CHINA DAILY (Feb. 3, 2004, 9:39AM),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2004-02/03/content_302540.htm; see also Cary Huang, Obama Forms
New Trade Body to Muscle China, CHINESE CIRCLE (Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.chinesecircle.com/?p=2041.
153. Jeremy Bogaisky, Full Text: President Obama’s State of the Union Address, FORBES (Jan. 24,
2012, 10:02 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeremybogaisky/2012/01/24/full-text-president-obamas-state-ofthe-union-address/; see also Cary Huang, President Obama is Likely to Focus on Securing Chinese Help for the
Troubled US Economy: But He Can’t Expect Sweeping Gestures from Beijing, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb.
12, 2012; see also Huang, supra note 152.
154. Huang, supra note 152. Professor Tao Wenzhao from the Institute of American Studies of the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences stated that he “can foresee more trade disputes and escalating rivalry in
every realm in the year ahead, from trade and currency to regional security and global diplomacy.” Id.; see
generally Stephen Rush & Sam Mirmirani, Can Increased Trade Prevent Conflict With China?, 8 INT’L BUS. &
ECON. RESEARCH J. 2 (2009) (discussing the possible effects increased trade will have on U.S.-China relations
and currency).
155. Bogaisky, supra note 153 (President Obama states that toughening trade policy on China will
increase the U.S. economy and create more American jobs); see also Huang, supra note 153.
156. Martin Crutsinger, Congress Wants Tough Stance with China Over Trade, DENVER POST (Sept. 17,
2010, 1:00 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/business/ci_16096873.
157. See id.
158. See Stuart Malawer, United States-China WTO Litigation (2001-2010): Active & Aggressive
Litigants (UPDATED), 59 VA. LAW. 28, 32 (2010) (argues that increased litigation is good for the WTO and
global trade relations because litigation creates a clarified rules-based trading system).
159. See Huang, supra note 152.
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B. Ramifications of the Appellate Body Tire Report on the Solar Trade Industry
Another industry where current disputes between the United States and
160
China are “heating up” is the photovoltaics industry (solar panel industry). In
October 2011, Oregon-based PV producer SolarWorld and six unnamed solar
companies filed an antidumping and countervailing duty petition with the U.S.
161
Department of Commerce and the USITC against China. Pursuant to the
162
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT (“AIGATT”), dumping
occurs when a product meant for domestic consumption is exported from one
country to another at a lower price than the destination country’s comparable
163
product.
Additionally, WTO members are prohibited from subsidizing
domestic manufacturers that produce products for exportation purposes;
164
otherwise, countervailing duties may be accessed. The purpose of this rule is
for the mutual assurance that a member’s conduct of legally assisting its domestic
industry will not illegally injure the domestic industry of another member
165
country. If a member country has reason to believe that a prohibited subsidy is
being permitted, the injured country may invoke countervailing duties on subject
166
exports. Although antidumping and countervailing duty petitions have some
167
elements distinguishable to safeguard measures, they both share two factors
168
relevant to this discussion: increasing rapidly and causation requirements.
According to USITC data, U.S. imports of solar panel components from
China increased from less than $100 million to $1.2 billion between 2006 and
169
2010. As of October 31, 2011, Chinese solar exports already reached $1.5
170
billion. Meanwhile, China’s share of global solar exports increased from twelve

160. Verbal Battle Intensifies Between US, China Over Charges of Dumping Solar PV Equipment,
RENEWABLE ENERGY REP., Nov. 14, 2011.
161. Id.
162. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S.
154, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp.pdf.
163. Sato, supra note 151, at 474.
164. Id. at 473.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 474.
167. Tiefer, supra note 29, at 76-78 (since dumping occurs when an exporter sells merchandise in the
importing country at less than fair value or below the price of production, one main element of analysis is
ascertaining the fair-market value or fair price of production within the exporter country); see also Peele III,
supra note 71, at 140.
168. See generally Peele III, supra note 71, at 140; see generally Tiefer, supra note 29, at 76-78 (when
dumping causes or threatens injury in an importing country, that country may impose antidumping or
countervailing measures).
169. Keith Chu, Trade Wars Over Chinese Renewables Exports Resume with Senate Report, Complaint
Filing, RENEWABLE ENERGY REP., Oct. 31, 2011.
170. Id.
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percent in 2006 to thirty-three percent in 2010, while the U.S. share shrunk from
171
eight percent to four percent over the same time period.
Similar to the tire industry, where the value of imports increased by 294.5
172
percent between 2004 and 2008, the value of imports within the solar industry
173
increased 833.33 percent between 2006 and 2010. Because the value of solar
industry imports far surpasses the value of tire industry imports during a fiveyear period, the DSB may likely concur with United States’ allegations of
‘increasing rapidly.” Additionally, because the AB held that “increasing rapidly”
required investigating authorities “to assess import trends over a sufficiently
174
recent period,” the 2006-2010 time period should suffice, just as the 2004-2008
175
time period was sufficient in the tire dispute.
In addition, the United States would be required to establish a causal link
176
between the dumped imports and the alleged injury. The AB Tire Report helps
clarify this term. If the United States can show that the increase in solar imports
is an “important” or “notable” factor in “bringing about, producing, or inducing”
a material injury to the U.S. solar industry, the United States should satisfy the
177
causation element of Section 16 of the U.S.-China Protocol.
Currently, many U.S. solar technology firms are struggling to survive and
178
losing millions of dollars in the process. One illustration is Solyndra, a solar
start-up manufacturer, which filed bankruptcy in August 2011, taking with it over
179
$500 million in government loan guarantees. In fact, recent U.S. solar
manufacturing firm bankruptcies and closings represent an almost one-fifth
180
reduction of the solar panel manufacturing capacity in the United States.
Therefore, if the current solar dispute reaches the WTO DSB, assuming the
United States is able to prove that China’s illegal subsidies and illegal dumping

171. Id.
172. Panel Report, supra note 81, at para. 7.85.
173. Chu, supra note 169.
174. Appellate Body Report, supra note 9, at para. 167.
175. Id. at para.147.
176. Sato, supra note 151, at 474.
177. Appellate Body Report, supra note 9, at para. 176.
178. Bryan Walsh, The Coming U.S.-China Solar War, TIME (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.time.com/time/
health/article/0,8599,2105734,00.html.
179. Id.; Anne C. Mulkern, Solyndra Bankruptcy Reveals Dark Clouds in Solar Power Industry, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 6, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/09/06/06greenwire-solyndra-bankruptcy-revealsdark-clouds-in-sol-45598.html?pagewanted=all. Analysts argue that one potential cause of Solyndra’s
bankruptcy is that the price of panels has decreased more than 40% in a year because the Chinese government is
investing in solar production (i.e. Chinese illegal subsidies), which has forced down product prices worldwide.
Id. In contrast, other analysts argue the main reason for Solyndra’s bankruptcy was because Solyndra
specialized in a unique commercial product, which was not generally useful for large fields or all rooftops, thus
limiting its uses. Therefore, Solyndra misunderstood the marketplace. Id.
180. Sato, supra note 151, at 464 (noting that the Solyndra bankruptcy and closing combined with two
other major solar manufacturers’ bankruptcies, Evergreen Solar and SpectraWatt, represent almost one-fifth of
the solar manufacturing capacity in the United States).
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are an “important factor” in “bringing about” these U.S. material injuries, it is
likely, under the precedent of the AB Tire Report, that the United States would
181
be successful on both the “increasing rapidly” and causation requirements.
C. Expiration of the U.S.-China Protocol
Since the U.S.-China Protocol, which authorizes safeguard measures, expires
182
in December 2013, the ability for the United States to impose safeguard
measures on other imports from China in the future is limited. Although Section
16.6 of the U.S.-China Protocol allows a safeguard to be imposed “only for such
period of time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy the market disruption,”
183
it does not limit the duration of the measure. The exact effect of the expiration
184
of the U.S.-China Protocol is unclear. Does this mean new safeguard measures
cannot be put in place after 2013? Can existing safeguards continue after this
date?
Despite some uncertainty once the U.S.-China Protocol expires, President
Obama will still need a comprehensive trade policy to address the challenges of
185
lower-priced imports. It is apparent that President Obama is aware of this as he
recently announced in his state-of-the-union address that he is strengthening his
186
Some economists argue, however, that returning to
policy on China.
multilateral agreements is the preferred course of action to boost lagging
economies around the world as opposed to an increase in trade dispute
187
litigation.
One possibility is that China could negotiate with the United States to grant
188
China a market-economy status. However, it is unlikely that China will obtain
market-economy status from the United States “due to a mixture of political and
189
economic factors at play.” Additionally, the United States maintains that China
181. See id.
182. Ji & Huang, supra note 7, at 11.
183. Panel Report, supra note 81, at annex B-1.
184. WTO Appellate Body Upholds Special Safeguard Measures Imposed by the United States on
Certain Chinese Tires, supra note 78.
185. Early, supra note 79, at 69.
186. Huang, supra note 153.
187. Early, supra note 79, at 70. On the benefits of free trade, economist Adam Smith wrote: “It is the
maxim of every prudent master of a family never to attempt to make at home what it will cost him more to
make than to buy,” and “[i]f a foreign country can supply us with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves can
make it, better buy it of them with some part of the produce of our own industry employed in a way in which we
have some advantage.” Tracy Elizabeth Dardick, The US-China Safeguard Provision, The GATT, and Thinking
Long Term, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 467, 476 (2005).
188. Gao, supra note 16, at 68. As of 2007, thirty-seven economies have recognized the market
economy status of China, excluding the United States. Id.
189. Wu, supra note 15, at 265. Political factors include the U.S. policy of using China’s interest in a
market economy status as a “leverage” with U.S. interests on “labor, currency, subsidy and other issues.” Id. at
266. Economic factors include deepening trade deficits, Chinese currency revaluation, and labor standards. Id.
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190

has yet to bring its trading laws into full compliance with WTO provisions.
Due to this, China may have to wait for the NME status to expire in its natural
191
course in 2016.
It is apparent that the uncertainty of the U.S.-China Protocol expiration has
192
deterred other U.S. industry groups from seeking safeguard measures. Since the
Panel Report in favor of the United States was issued in 2009, no new safeguard
193
petitions have been filed by U.S. industries. Although it may be unlikely that
any new U.S. safeguard petitions will be filed before the U.S.-China Protocol
194
expires in 2013, it does not preclude President Obama’s new Enforcement Task
Force from investigating and eventually obtaining some relief from unfair trading
practices either through the DSB or through subsequent bilateral agreements with
195
China. However, the WTO may experience an abrupt influx in safeguard
196
disputes filed against China by other countries such as Canada.
Once the U.S.-China Protocol expires, terms will most likely revert back to
the WTO Product-Specific Safeguard Agreement, which is applicable to all
197
members of the WTO. This may deter the United States somewhat from
bringing future safeguard petitions against China because of the heightened
198
“serious injury” standard under the normal WTO Product-Specific Safeguard.
Regardless, even though China’s nine-year membership within the WTO may be
199
regarded as “still in its infancy,” it is evident that China is willing to protect its
200
interests in future trade disputes. China also complains of being the victim of
201
protectionist measures by the United States. Despite President Obama’s recent

at 265-66.
190. Loridas, supra note 1, at 414.
191. See Wu, supra note 15, at 269.
192. WTO Appellate Body Upholds Special Safeguard Measures Imposed by the United States on
Certain Chinese Tires, supra note 78.
193. Ji & Huang, supra note 7, at 12 (noting that since the tires case in 2009, no other safeguard measure
petition has been filed by the United States nor any other member); see also WTO Appellate Body Upholds
Special Safeguard Measures Imposed by the United States on Certain Chinese Tires, supra note 78.
194. Ji & Huang, supra note 7, at 11.
195. Early, supra note 79, at 70.
196. Cyndee Todgham Cherniak, Canadian Manufacturers May Have an Opportunity to Gain Market
Share From Chinese Importers, TRADE LAW. BLOG (Jan. 11, 2011, 6:36 AM), http://tradelawyersblog.com/
blog/archive/2011/january/article/canadian-manufacturers-may-have-an-opportunity-to-gain-market-sharefrom-chinese-importers/?tx_ttnews%5Bday%5D=11&cHash=7a7a817936 (stating that Canadian manufacturing
companies have less than two years left to gain market shares by filing safeguard measures against China).
197. See supra Part II.A (explaining that the WTO Product-Specific Safeguard is applicable to all
members of the WTO).
198. See id.
199. Esplugues Mota, supra note 55, at 3 (stating that a seven year membership within the WTO is
regarded as “still in its infancy”).
200. Ji & Huang, supra note 7, at 36. In 2009, China alone accounted for half of the fourteen new WTO
disputes. Thus, “it’s just a matter of time before China not only is required to defend cases but will feel inclined
to initiate cases against other Members.” Id.
201. Loridas, supra note 1, at 414.
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202

announcement of creating the “Trade Enforcement Unit,” some economists
argue that it would be more advantageous for him to use his executive power to
203
bring China back to the negotiating table.
V. CONCLUSION
After a long and arduous accession into the WTO, which incorporated a
lower threshold of safeguard measures as found in the U.S.-China Protocol,
China has quickly grown into one of the largest exporter/importer member states
204
in the world. As of October 2010, China ranks number one in merchandise
205
exports and number two in merchandise imports. Simultaneously, the United
States ranks number two in merchandise exports and number one in merchandise
206
imports. Because China and the United States are the two largest exporters and
207
208
importers globally, trade disputes are likely to continue into the future.
Vital takeaways from the AB Tire Report are critical term definitions such as
“increasing,” “rapidly,” and “a significant cause.” Thus, it is possible to apply
these newly defined terms to on-going and subsequent trade disputes before the
209
USITC and the WTO. The solar industry is one such example where the
percentage of increased imports from China is near or beyond percentages found
in the tire industry dispute, in which the WTO found in favor of the United
210
States. Because the AB Tire Report is the first to completely uphold a
safeguard measure, it provides vital and invaluable insight into predicting
211
outcomes of disputes in the future.
One advantage to China is that the more restrictive U.S.-China Protocol is set
212
to expire in December 2013. Once it expires, both countries will likely be
bound under the WTO Product-Specific Safeguard Agreement, thus eliminating
213
the lower causation and harm thresholds found in the U.S.-China Protocol.
Thereafter, the United States would need to show “serious injury” which may

202. Bogaisky, supra note 153.
203. Early, supra note 79, at 70.
204. Wu, supra note 15, at 228; Spadi, supra note 31, at 441.
205. China Trade Profile, supra note 6.
206. United States Trade Profile, supra note 6.
207. China Trade Profile, supra note 6; United States Trade Profile, supra note 6.
208. Bogaisky, supra note 153 (creating the Enforcement Task Force for the specific purpose to
investigate future unfair trading practices).
209. See supra Parts IV.B-C.
210. See supra Part IV.B.
211. See supra Part IV.
212. Gao, supra note 16, at 55-56; see also Halverson, supra note 18, at 330-31.
213. See supra Part II.A.
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deter future safeguard disputes with China. This is already evident in the fact
215
that the United States has not filed any safeguard measures since 2009.
Due to the short time before the U.S.-China Protocol will expire, it is
216
unlikely that any U.S. safeguard petitions will be filed until then. However, the
AB Tire Report provides invaluable insight into how future international trade
disputes between all WTO members will likely be analyzed and determined by
the WTO AB.

214. See id.
215. Ji & Huang, supra note 7, at 12.
216. Id.
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